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ABSTRACT

This paper examines noncoercion in international struggles, reviews instances in which positive inducements were combined with or used instead of coercion, and analyzes conditions affecting the utilization and effectiveness of noncoercive means in conducting international relations. Coercion refers to actual and threatened violent and nonviolent negative sanctions including use of military force, threat of bombings, and economic boycotts. Noncoercion is interpreted to include persuasion (one party's efforts to convince an adversary to accede to its requests) and reward (positive sanctions and/or offers to the adversary of something it values and accepts in anticipation of a reciprocating concession). Examples of noncoercion in international struggles include negotiations between Israel and Egypt following President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in 1977, the Nuclear Test Ban Agreement in 1963, and withdrawal of the Soviets from Austria in 1958. These instances were all part of larger conflicts beset with escalations, de-escalations, violence, negotiated agreements, and continuing tensions. The conclusion is that noncoercive means will be more effective in solving international struggles if all adversaries act on the assumption that even the most bitter enemies have some common interests, coercive alternatives are too costly, noncoercive inducements must be attractive and realistic, and the motives, interests and perceptions of all negotiators are of paramount importance. (Author/DB)

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NONCOERCIVE INDUCEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

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"Alternative International Security Systems"

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NONCOERCIVE INDUCEMENTS IN INTERNATIONAL CONFLICTS

International conflicts are not waged only coercively. Yet most practitioner, popular, and scholarly attention has always been directed at actual or threatened coercion, particularly violent coercion. Recent work has documented the limitations of military coercion and threats of coercion in the pursuit of foreign policy (George and Smoke, 1974). We lack systematic knowledge about the role of noncoercion in international conflicts: about when such means are used, how they are combined with coercion, and under what circumstances they are more or less effective. In this paper, I examine the concepts relating to noncoercion and then review actual instances of the use of positive inducements, as they are mixed with coercion in severe international struggles. I will then analyse the conditions which affect the utilization and effectiveness of noncoercive means in conducting conflicts.

Inducements

We must explicate the meaning of coercion and noncoercion as used here. Coercion refers to violent and nonviolent negative sanctions, encompassing their actual employment and their threatened use. This includes the use of military force against an adversary, the threat of bombings, and economic boycotts. Two other modes of conducting a struggle can be distinguished; they are persuasion and reward (Kriesberg, 1973; Gamson, 1968; Deutsch, 1973; Baldwin, 1971). Persuasion refers to one party's efforts to convince an adversary to accede to its requests; the adversary is urged to agree because agreement would be in its own interest or in conformance with its own values. Reward refers to positive sanctions, to offers or grants to the adversary of something it values and made in anticipation of a reciprocating concession. In

this discussion, I will call both persuasion and reward positive inducements.

I am distinguishing the existence of conflicts or disputes from the means by which adversaries pursue their goals. A conflict is a situation in which two or more parties, or their representatives, believe they have incompatible objectives (Kriesberg, 1973). For example, one party may wish the other to yield a piece of territory it holds and which both wish to possess. In trying to induce the other to yield, a variety of threats, promises, and persuasive arguments will be combined in different ways. The meaning of each inducement is affected by the context provided by the other inducements. The package of inducements varies over time in the course of a struggle, as it escalates and de-escalates. My attention to inducements is focused on the strategy of bargaining more than on the techniques of negotiation.

The distinctions between persuasion, coercion and reward are conceptually difficult and the problems in conceptualizing the differences underlie issues about how to operationally assess each. At one level it is clearly recognizable that the properties of punishing actions are quite different from ones which are rewarding. Negative sanctions are employed to deter or to increase the cost to an adversary of doing or being something that is undesired. Positive sanctions are employed to bring about or sustain desired conduct or thoughts. But even this simple distinction has ambiguities when we begin to consider preferences and expectations of the sender and the receiver of such sanctions.

Distinctions between these inducements might be based on the intentions or motives of the sender, on the perceptions of the receiver, on objective standards as set by the observer-analyst, or on the meaning overtly given to the inducement by the sender. Intentions and motives for large collectivities are problematic to say the least; furthermore, they shift as the response of the adversary shifts. Using the perceptions of the receiver as the basis

for the distinction draws our attention away from questions about the factors affecting misperception. And to have the observers establish their own criteria may be too irrelevant to the thoughts and actions of the adversaries. The sender's purported meaning, as directed toward the adversary-receiver, is used here to distinguish among the inducements. International actors generally indicate how they want the target of a message to understand it--as a threat, a promise, or a reason to do what they want. This usage allows us to ask about the conditions which affect the choice of inducements and to ask how those inducements are perceived by the people to whom they are directed.

Interlocking Conflicts

I argue in this paper that noncoercive inducements always play some role in international conflict because conflicts are never purely zero sum. There are always some common and complementary interests, even among the greatest of enemies. This is true because the enemies are not unitary entities. Rather, they are complex and overlapping groupings. Consequently, any given conflict is interlocked in many other conflicts and therefore persuasion or reward may be thought useful--perhaps to divide the enemy, to gain additional allies, to solidify support, or for other purposes. I will explicate the ways in which every fight consists of many adversaries.

Each party of any social conflict is made up of many component groups and those groups have somewhat different interests and views about the specific conflict. Each conflict party, in attacking or otherwise trying to get its adversary to change, could pay attention to the several groups making up the other side, differently attempting to threaten or persuade them. Each party to a conflict has allies or potential allies. Each adversary, therefore, has a somewhat different conflict with each member of the opposing coalition. A conflict generally involves several issues and the set of adversaries

varies with the issues in dispute. Finally, conflicts generally occur in a series: each dispute may be seen as part of a long-run struggle.

This discussion does not deny that adversaries and observers generally regard one conflict as primary at a given time. But what is regarded as the primary conflict shifts and those shifts are critical for changes in means of conflict. For analytical purposes, here, I consider one conflict as the primary or focal one and examine how it is inter-related with others.

I distinguish six ways in which conflicts are interlocked: 1) serial or nested in time, 2) converging or nested in social space, 3) superimposed or linked, 4) cross-cutting, 5) internal, and 6) concurrent. I will briefly discuss each in turn.

First, every conflict may be viewed as one in a series of fights between the same adversaries. Adversaries may choose to bracket a given conflict within a variety of time periods. For example, the American-Soviet conflict may be viewed as occurring as a series of struggles each enduring for several years or as a series of short intermittent crises. In any case, each fight may be viewed as following and preceeding others. One implication of this is that every element of a fight may be viewed as setting a precedent for the next one.

Conflicts also converge. Separate groups may coalesce as allies against an adversary or coalition of adversaries. Such coalitions may be based on broadening collective identifications. Thus, the focal conflict may be between two governments and the leaders of each government try to mobilize their domestic constituency, and other people who may share ethnic, religious, or ideological identifications. Adversary parties may also increase in number or scope as they converge on different sides of the issue in contention. Thus, a fight between one government and another may be defined by other governments, peoples, or political movements as a struggle between developed

and developing countries and choose sides accordingly. The focal conflict may be between large entities and encompass a fight between relatively subordinate entities; in that case, we may speak of proxy wars or a struggle between pawns. Every focal conflict, then, may be embedded in a broader set of social conflicts or itself may encompass more limited ones.

Superimposition is the third way in which conflicts are interlocked. Few or many contentious issues may be superimposed on each other (Dahrendorf, 1959). Thus, two adversaries may be in a fight over one issue and others are added to the struggle or conversely particular issues may be separated out and put aside. In American-Soviet relations, this has sometimes been referred to as "linkage." At different times, issues about arms control, the war in Vietnam, human rights, and others have been linked or have been de-coupled in adversary negotiations.

Cross-cutting conflicts, the fourth type of interlocking conflicts, has been particularly studied by sociologists (Simmel, 1955; Ross, 1920; Coser, 1956; Kriesberg, 1973). Cross-cutting conflicts may be based on divisions within and across adversaries or among a set of adversaries allying themselves differently on several issues of contention. In the first case, the protagonists in the focal conflict are each divided on other issues and the adversaries within each protagonist are allied with their counterparts elsewhere. For example, conflicts about petroleum prices and allocations involve governments, managers of multinational oil companies, consumers, and other collectivities which cut across country borders. Cross-cutting conflicts are also based on the multiplicity of issues in contention. Thus, if two governments are adversaries on one issue but on the same side against other governments on a different issue, conflicts related to those various issues are cross-cutting. For example, we can see some signs of East-West issues cross-cutting North-South (developed-developing country) issues.

The fifth kind of interlocking conflicts are the ones which are internal to one of the adversaries. A number of writers have examined the way in which conflicts are linked to external ones (Simmel, 1955; Tanter; 1966; Wilkenfeld, 1969; Rosenau, 1973; Kriesberg, 1973). Most of this research uses countries as units and concerns the relationship between domestic turmoil and conflict with foreign conflict behavior. However, any major actor in international conflict can be considered to have subgroups within it which themselves may be in contention. Thus, a government consists of many agencies and it competes with opposition groups; or the society may be divided by differences which are the basis for intense struggles. An internal conflict also may be an international one; it may occur within a coalition which is one side in a larger conflict. For example, consider the Cyprus dispute. The Greek and Turkish government fight about Cyprus may be regarded as internal to NATO, which is a protagonist in the focal conflict with the Warsaw Pact countries. If the struggle between Greek and Turkish ethnic organizations on Cyprus is considered the focal conflict, then each group's alliance with the governments of Greece and Turkey is the basis for a converging conflict.

Finally, the sixth kind of conflict I distinguish is the concurrent conflict. A concurrent conflict is an external one occurring along with the focal one, but it does not involve all the primary adversaries in the focal struggle. Thus, one of the adversaries in the focal conflict has a side fight with another adversary who has no direct relevance to the adversary in the focal conflict. For example, the Egyptian government's involvement in the war in Yemen in the 1960's was concurrent with its conflict with Israel; but insofar as the Israelis were not involved in Yemen, the fight was concurrent to the focal conflict between Egypt and Israel. Furthermore, concurrent conflict may involve <u>none</u> of the primary adversaries; it may be happening elsewhere in the world and preoccupying major powers elsewhere;

this preoccupation affects the possible involvement of those major powers in the focal conflict.

This discussion has pointed out the many ways in which international conflicts are inter-related. Observers and participants may be paying attention to different focal conflicts. What we call a particular interlocking fight depends on which conflict we regard as salient or primary. Obviously, the participants in a struggle try to define one or another conflict as primary, depending on what they regard as best advancing their interests in the fight. I use the term focal conflict to indicate that we must focus on one conflict at a time, but that other focuses are also, perhaps equally, valid.

Cases and Actual Inducements

This paper is based on analyses of several specific initiatives in the context of enduring international conflicts. More detailed accounts are reported elsewhere (Kriesberg, 1978; Kriesberg and Klein, 1980; Kriesberg, 1980). I have been examining specific escalations and de-escalations in the struggle between Israeli governments and Arab governments and groups and between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. governments and allied groups. I have selected some instances in which noncoercive inducements have presumably played a relatively significant role--instances of peace initiatives. These are times when one conflict party, or more than one, has sought to gain an immediate objective by launching a peace effort or de-escalating campaign. These efforts sometimes culminate in one or more negotiated agreements.

Within the Arab-Israeli struggle, I have examined in particular the following cases: 1) the negotiations toward an agreement between the Israeli government and King Abdullah of Jordan in 1949 and 1950, 2) the negotiations in 1953 and 1954 between the Egyptian and Israeli governments, 3) the negotiations about the Johnston plan to establish a Jordan Valley Authority,

4) the cease fire agreement between Egypt and Israel ending the War of Attrition in 1970, 5) the discussion of a partial withdrawal of Israeli military forces from the Sinai in 1971, and 6) the negotiations between the Egyptian and Israeli governments initiated by President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November, 1977.

Within the U.S. and U.S.S.R. struggle, I have examined two cases in particular. First, the negotiations related to the Austrian State Treaty, signed in May 1955. This agreement, resulting in the withdrawal of Soviet and Western occupation forces, was related to the peaceful co-existence campaign which Krushchev conducted following the death of Stalin. The second case relates to the negotiations leading to the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Agreement in the summer of 1963. This and other agreements were reached after the American University speech John Kennedy gave in June 1963. I also am considering later instances of movements toward detente.

All these cases happened within the context of longstanding struggles in which coercive threats and even the use of violence have occurred. The potential for violence on a massive scale was obviously present in the background of all these peace initiatives and moves to relax tension. Nevertheless, within these coercive contexts, mixtures of persuasion, reward, and implicit threats were presented by various groups and directed at adversaries.

Several kinds of rewards and persuasive arguments appeared in the cases examined. Among the positive sanctions offered and promised, the withdrawal of military forces from a territory previously occupied by the military forces occurred in several instances. The Soviet government offered to withdraw its occupation forces from Austria in 1954 and later did so. Some persons within the Israeli government, notably Dayan, in 1970 raised the idea of a partial Israeli military withdrawal from a part of the Sinai. Another kind of reward is the offer of recognition of legitimacy and assurances of fundamental security. This was offered, in

varying degrees, by the Egyptian government toward the Israeli state, most notably at the end of 1977. In both these kinds of rewards, withdrawal of threats implicit in occupation or lack of recognition are offered as rewards. The third kind of positive sanction is a promise not to join an enemy coalition. Thus, Austrian leaders in advancing their interests in having Soviet forces withdrawn from Austria, promised not to ally the Austrian state with the U.S. and its Western allies (Allard, 1970). President Sadat, in the negotiations toward a peace treaty with Israel, variously offered assurances not to join an Arab alliance against Israel.

The fourth kind of positive sanction used in these cases were offers to forego weapons testing, for example nuclear weapons testing in the atmosphere. In general, offers to limit certain kinds of weapons development was the essence of bargaining about strategic arms limitations and the associated efforts toward reducing tensions between the U.S. and the Soviet governments. Offers to reduce or limit deployment of military forces were also made in conjunction with peace treaty negotiations between Egyptian and Israeli government representatives.

Fifth, governments have offered to open their borders to more direct exchange of personal contact. Since the U.S. government and the Israeli government for several reasons have expressed the desire for such openness on the part of the Soviet and Arab governments, Soviet and Egyptian offers to make this possible were presented as positive sanctions.

Finally, a fifth kind of reward was relatively often used: the promise to make particular resources available to the adversary. The resources were quite diverse: it includes Egyptian assurances about Israeli use of the Suez Canal and availability for sale of oil from the Sinai; it includes U.S. making available to the Soviet Union the sale of grain and certain kinds of industrial equipment and it includes the sharing of the waters of the Jordan River among territories bordering upon it.

I have not yet conducted a systematic examination of the variety of persuasive arguments that adversaries have directed at each other. I can nevertheless, enumerate several kinds of arguments that were presented. One kind of persuasive effort takes the form of an actor asking the adversary to take its role. The adversary, for example, is assured that what is being sought is necessary for national security and is not intended to be used aggressively or as a threat. For example, during Egyptian and Israeli peace treaty negotiations, Israeli military officers have taken Egyptian officers on tours of the West Bank to demonstrate the Israeli vulnerability to attack if an armed enemy occupied certain positions.

A second kind of argument points out complementary interests which would be enhanced by yielding what is sought. Thus, the Austrian leaders sought to convince Soviet leaders that indeed Austria wanted to be and would remain neutral (Allard, 1970). They argued how neutrality was in their interests and how that would be beneficial to the Soviet Union as well.

A third kind of persuasive argument tries to turn a divisive issue into a problem which is shared and which needs a mutually satisfactory solution. Discussions about arms control often take this form: each side points out that a war would severely damage all parties and hence war constitutes a common problem. Proposals to reduce or limit certain kinds of military developments, then, are presented as reducing a shared problem. In discussions of nuclear weapons testing, particularly testing in the atmosphere, adversaries stressed the common damage that radioactivity released into the atmosphere generated. In addition, Soviet and U.S. leaders could argue that public outcries and protests by other governments constituted a common problem shared by Soviet and U.S. government policy makers.

A fourth kind of argument pertains particularly to the interlocking character of conflicts. One actor may try to convince its adversary that they have a common antagonist against whom they can work together. Thus, in the

1963 discussions in Moscow to negotiate the partical nuclear test ban agreement, some suggestions were made by U.S. officials of the advantages of limiting the nuclear club and the advantage of adding pressure to inhibit China from developing its nuclear weapons capability (Schlesinger, 1965). In conjunction with the Egyptian and Israeli 1977 discussions, suggestions were made that an agreement between the Egyptian and Israeli governments would help exclude Soviet and Arab-radical influence in the Middle East and thus serve the common interests of both governments.

Finally, much persuasive arguments are phrased in terms of appeals to common values and norms. For example, appeals are made to fundamental values of freedom, national self-determination, and norms of fairness and equity.

Conditions for Use of Noncoercive Inducements

I now turn to consider the conditions in which noncoercive inducements actually are introduced into a conflict; that is, I offer explanations for international actors resorting to such inducements. I will examine three sets of reasons: those pertaining to one actor's considerations primarily, those pertaining to joint considerations of the adversaries, and those pertaining to considerations of possible intermediaries.

A government or another international actor has several unilateral reasons for applying noncoercive inducements. Naturally, these are variations of the reasons actors use coercion. One set of reasons has to do with placating or seeking to garner domestic support. But instead of seeking to do that by seeming to be tough or hard-line in opposing adversaries, it appears useful to stress moderation and conciliation. This may be the case when there is a new leadership and it wishes to distinguish itself from the predecessors and they adhered to a relatively hard-line in relations with the adversaries. This may also be the case when a leadership group believes that coercive inducements are unavailable and yet some activity is necessary

to maintain their leadership. For example, President Sadat, in his memoirs explains that he launched his February 1971 peace initiative because Egypt could not attack Israel and a leader had to maintain a high level of activity (Sadat, 1978).

Noncoercive inducements are also put forward by one actor in order to appeal to, placate, or garner support from groups who are not already fully engaged in the focal conflict. Thus, governments may offer concessions or hold out promises of favors to an adversary in order to appear reasonable in the eyes of other government leaders, for example, as represented in the United Nations. They may also do it in order to gain support or at least acceptance of their demands by the attentive public generally. Sometimes the concessions are made to satisfy or appeal to specific groups outside the primary conflict. Thus, the Egyptian government, under President Sadat, has several times taken actions or held out promises to Israel in order to appear reasonable and conciliatory in the eyes of U.S. government policy makers and the U.S. public generally (Khouri, 1976; Heikal, 1975).

An international actor may also propose noncoercive inducements in order to divide and hopefully split an opposing coalition. Thus, Soviet policy makers promoted ideas of peaceful competition and offered to withdraw from Austria in order to inhibit rearmament of West Germany and reduce the solidarity of the U.S. and West European governments against the Soviet government (Khruschev, 1974). Appeals may also be made to groups within an adversary country to gain support against the adversary government.

Many of the reasons adversaries employ noncoercive inducements pertain to joint considerations. The adversaries recognize, perhaps after some exchange of signals and tentative approaches, that there are common interests which justify a step away from coercion. One such consideration is the apparent convergence of interest among adversaries against other parties.

Thus, Soviet and U.S. policy makers in 1963 may have seen some common interests between their countries as against the People's Republic of China (Jacobson and Stein, 1966). In 1977, the Begin and Sadat governments may have seen some common interests in limiting the power of the Soviet Union and of radical Arab groups in the Middle East (Zion and Uri, 1979).

Another consideration is a shared belief that coercive alternatives are not available or are likely to be too costly. The adversaries may believe that coercion is not available; this may arise when all opponents foresee grave risks to escalating coercion. The Cuban missile crisis in October 1962 raised the spector of war vividly to the minds of U.S. and soviet policy makers; this may have contributed to the readiness of Kennedy and Krushchev to find alternative ways of pursuing national objectives. Such efforts did follow the missile crisis, eventuating in a series of agreements in the spring and summer of 1963.

Finally, the adversaries may perceive a possible set of complementary interests that can be mutually advanced. Such complementary interests obviously provide the basis for an exchange of rewards. Non-coercive inducements are essential in developing an agreement embodying an exchange of positive sanctions.

The third set of considerations pertains to the role of intermediaries. An intermediary may have its own interests in facilitating an agreement between adversaries and encourage one of them to make a positive gesture to the other. Such encouragement may be influential if the support of intermediary is important. Thus, at various times, the Israeli and the Egyptian governments have attempted to make conciliatory gestures toward the other in order to sustain or gain U.S. policy makers' support. Sometimes the U.S. has promised to make direct contributions that would be beneficial to adversary countries--if they would cooperate with each other. This was the case with the plans for the Jordan Valley Authority idea, sometimes called the Johnston

Plan (Khouri, 1976; Berger, 1965).

In the actual cases examined, the considerations of each adversary, of the adversaries jointly, and of intermediaries all combine to effect the use of noncoercive inducements.

Effectiveness of Noncoercive Inducements

Assessing the effectiveness of noncoercive inducements is obviously difficult. What the adversaries want from each other is often obscure; the outcome of a struggle is ambiguous, and the extent to which any given action has contributed to that outcome is difficult to judge. Thus, what Krushchev wanted to gain in his struggle with Eisenhower and the U.S. policy makers in 1954 and 1955 is obscure. The state of the relationship between the Soviet Union and the U.S. was ambiguous, and the role of Soviet noncoercive inducements in affecting that ambiguous state is certainly difficult to measure.

Acknowledging all this, I will make some observations based on analyses of instances when the use of noncoercive inducements were not effective, when they were to the advantage of one group at the expense of an adversary, and when they contributed to the mutual benefit of two or more adversaries. I will note some of the factors which seem to be associated with the effectiveness of positive sanctions and persuasion.

First, the inducements must be convincing to a wary adversary. This means that the positive sanctions must be able to penetrate suspicions. This requires clarity and often novelty; but a leader may find it risky to offer clear and attractive positive sanctions to an adversary for fear that he will lessen support from his national constituency and his coalition organized in opposition to the adversary. President Sadat's visit to Jerusalem in November 1977 illustrates the power of a striking action in breaking through mistrust in an adversary; but the cost in coalition support is also illustrated.

When agreements between adversaries have been reached, as in the case of the Austrian State Treaty or the Partial Nuclear Test Ban Agreement, non-coercive inducements have played a contributory role. For example, the June 1963 American University speech by John F. Kennedy conveyed effective promises and persuasive arguments, and even small positive sanctions in the form of suggesting that the U.S. may share some responsibility for the Cold War (Gromyko, 1973). But the Agreements reached were based upon a convergence of interests among the leaders of the Soviet and U.S. governments for those particular Agreements.

Finally, an important element in reaching agreements is the role played by third parties: leaders of countries with strong interests in the issue at stake, but not clearly within the camp of either primary adversary. Thus, in the case of the Austrian State Treaty, the Austrian leaders themselves helped bring about the agreement. In the case of the partial nuclear test ban agreement, the Peoples Republic of China was a significant factor, first in inhibiting Soviet agreement and ultimately making it possible when the alliance with the Soviet Union was ruptured. In the case of several of the peace initiatives taken in the Middle East conflicts, the U.S. and the U.N. played important encouraging roles (Quandt, 1977).

Conclusions

In general, coercive, rewarding, and persuasive efforts are limited in bringing about the agreements studied. It must be recognized, in dealing with international affairs, that adversaries can influence each other very little. Coercion, too, has circumscribed effectiveness. If adversaries agree about something, it is because the leaders of each have concluded it suits their purposes and the conclusion is based on domestic circumstances, environmental conditions, and actions of third parties, as well as the actions of opponents. Within each country, public outcries and the judgments of scientists, pressures from the military and defense industry leaders all

affect the decisions the country's leaders take. These are difficult for an adversary to affect, but they may be subject to some persuasive efforts over the very long run. Environmental conditions are important in the form of expectations and constraints which other governments, institutions, and past history establish. That is one reason that negotiations once conducted for an extended period of time are difficult to terminate and tend to continue even with little prospect of resolution. The significance of the environmental conditions is such that efforts at manipulation of the environment may be effective.

The analyses also suggest that the inducements which a conflict party uses to gain its objectives are inter-related and they may contradict each other as far as the adversary is concerned. If the various inducements do not support each other, they may nulify each other and make each ineffective. Although carrots and sticks may seem to be usefully combined, unless the blend is skillfully done, each will seem unconvincing.

This analysis suggests one policy implication to me. Thoughtful and reflective consideration of the persuasive and rewarding inducements available to the leaders of each adversary probably would increase their effectiveness. For this to occur, it is necessary to pay attention to the interests and perceptions of the adversaries. At times, this was done by Kennedy and by Khrushchev as well as by others; but having supporting staff who think and develop ideas for such use would increase the range of specific techniques available to each leader and representative, rather than depend on personal intuition and experience. For example, one major issue in making rewards or persuasive communications effective is credibility. How can one party be convincing to an adversary? One way to increase credibility is to demonstrate commitment to a proposed policy by actions. For example, if the United States government asserts its desire to seek arms control and arms reduction, the development of reconversion plans and legislation would make

assertions of sincerity and seriousness of the intentions to reduce arms more persuasive.

In a period when the risks of massive deaths in wars confront us all and matters of great consequence are in dispute, the leaders of all countries should seek ways to pursue their conflicts and yet avert violence. We must all learn much more about how nonviolent coercion can be used in international conflict and we also need to understand how persuasive and rewarding inducements can be effectively used. As we become more familiar with and knowledgeable about nonviolent ways to conduct international conflicts, violence will be less likely to be used.

We need to do more than assess how well, under varying circumstances, noncoercive and nonviolent inducements yield gains for one or more parties in a dispute. We also need to learn about popular and elite conceptions about the effectiveness and intrinsic value of different mixes of coercive and noncoercive inducements. Recourse to coercion and the threats of coercion seems to be natural and patriotic to wide segments of the population in every country. Beliefs in the effectiveness of one means rather than another also affects their actual effectiveness.

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